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PROBABILITY JUDGMENT IN ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE 
Glenn Shafer 
School of Business, University of Kansas 
This paper is concerned with two theories of probability 
judgment: the Bayesian theory and the theory of belief functions. 
It illustrates these theories with some simple examples and 
discusses some of the issues that arise when we try to implement 
them in expert systems. 
The Bayesian theory is well known; its main ideas go back to 
the work of Thomas Bayes (1702-1761). The theory of belief 
functions, often called the Dempster-Shafer theory in the artifi­
cial intelligence community, is less well known, but it has even 
older antecedents; belief-function arguments appear in the work 
of George Hooper (164 0-1723) and James Bernoulli (1654 -1705). 
For elementary expositions of the theory of belief functions, see 
Shafer (1976,1985). 
1. Two Probability Languages. 
The Bayesian theory and the theory of belief functions both 
use the standard calculus of probability, but they apply this 
calculus to concrete problems in different ways. The difference 
is best understood in the context of the general philosophy of 
constructive probability (Shafer, 1981; Shafer and Tversky, 
1985). 
According to the philosophy of constructive probability, 
numerical probability judgment involves fitting a problem to a 
scale of canonical examples. The canonical examples usually 
involve the picture of chance in some way, but different choices 
of canonical examples are possible, and these different choices 
produce different theories or, if you will, different languages 
in which to express probability judgments. No matter what lan­
guage is used, the judgments are subjective; the subjectivity 
enters when we judge that the evidence in our actual problem 
matches in_strength and significance the evidence in the canoni­
cal example. 
In the Bayesian probability language, the canonical examples 
are examples in which the answer to the question with which we 
are concerned is determined by chance, and the chances of the 
different possible answers are known. Within this language, many 
different designs for probability judgment are possible. Some 
designs, which we may call total-evidence designs, fit our evi­
dence about a question to these canonical examples by comparing 
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it directly to knowledge that the answer is determined by known 
chances. Other designs, which we may call conditioning designs, 
initially compare only part of our evidence to such knowledge and 
then take the remaining evidence into account by conditioning. 
Much that is written about Bayesian methods pretehds that we 
come to practical problems knowing which part of our evidence is 
to be taken into account by conditioning. Sometimes it is even 
suggested that all of our evidence should be taken into account 
by conditioning. But in fact the choice of which evidence to 
take into account by conditioning and which to use in assessing 
initial probabilities is usually the most important choice in the 
design of a Bayesian analysis. 
It may be useful to" elaborate this point. Suppose we want 
to make probability judgments about a frame of discernment S. (A 
frame of discernment is a list of possible answers to a question; 
so th1s means we want to make probability judgments about which 
answer is correct. ) We reflect on what relevant evidence we 
have, and produce a list E1, • . .  ,En of facts that seem to sum­
marize this evidence adequately. A conditioning design might ask 
us to stand back from our knowledge of these n facts, pretend 
that we do not yet know them, and construct a probability measure 
over a frame that considers not only the question considered by S 
but also the question whether El,···,En are or are not true; 
often we construct this measure by making probability judgments 
P(s) and P(El& • . .  &Enls} for each s in S. The problem with this 
strategy is that we now need to look for evidence on which to 
base these probability judgments. We have used our best evidence 
up, as it were, but now we have an even larger judgmental task 
than before. According to some theorists, there is no problem-­
it is normative to have the requisite probabilities, whether we 
can identify relevant evidence or not. But according to the 
constructive philosophy, there is a problem, a problem which 
limits how far we want to go. We may want to condition only on 
some of the Ei, reserving the others to help us make the proba­
bility judgments. 
Whereas the Bayesian probability language uses canonical 
examples where known chances are attached directly the possible 
answers to the question asked, the language of belief functions 
uses canonical examples where known chances may be attached only 
to the possible answers to a related question. 
Suppose, indeed, that S and T denote, respectively, the 
possible answers to two distinct but related questions. When we 
say that these questions are related, we mean that a given answer 
to one of the questions may not be compatible with all the possi­
ble answers to the other. Let us write "sC t" when s is an 
element of S, t is an element of T, and s and t are compatible. 
Given a probability measure P over s (we assume for simplicity 
that P is defined for all subsets of S), we may define a function 
Bel on subsets of T by setting 
Be 1 (B) = P { s I if set, then t is in B} . (l) 
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for each subset B of T. The right-hand side of (1) is the 
probability that P gives to those answers to the question consi­
dered by S that require the answer to the question considered by 
T to be in B: the idea behind (1) is that this probability should 
be counted as reason to believe that the latter answer is in B. 
We might, of course, have more direct evidence about the question 
considered by T, but if we do not, or if we want to leave other 
evidence aside for the moment, then we may call Bel(B) a measure 
of the reason we have to believe B based just on P. 
We call the function Bel given by (1) the belief function 
obtained by extending P from S to T. A probabil1ty measure P is 
a special kind of belief function; this is just the case where 
S=T an�C t  if and only if s=t. 
\ 
All the usual devices of probability are available to the 
language of belief functions, but in general they are applied in 
the background, at the level of S, before extending to degrees of 
belief on T, the frame of interest. Thus the language of belief 
functions is a generalization of the Bayesian language. 
2. Three Examples. 
Example 1. Is Fred, who is about to speak to me, going to 
speak truthfully, or is he, as he sometimes does, going to speak 
carelessly, saying something that comes into his mind, paying no 
attention to whether it is true or not? Let S denote the possi­
ble answers to this question: S={truthful,careless}. Suppose I 
know from experience that Fred's announcements are truthful re­
ports on what he knows about 80% of the time and are careless 
statements the other 20% of the time. Then I have a probability 
measure P over S: P{truthful}=. 8, P{careless}=.2. 
Are the streets outside slippery? Let T denote the possible 
answers to this question: T={yes,no}. And suppose Fred's an­
nouncement turns out to be, "The streets outside are slippery." 
Taking account of this, I have a compatibility relation between S 
and T: " truthful" is compatible with " yes" but not with " no," 
while "careless" is compatible with both " yes" and " no." Apply­
ing (1), I find 
Bel ({yes})=.8 and Bel ({no})=O : ( 2 ) 
Fred's announcement gives me an 80% reason to believe the streets 
are slippery outside, but no reason to believe they are not. 
How might a Bayesian argument using this evidence go? A 
total-evidence design would use all my evidence, Fred's announce­
ment included, to make a direct probability judgment about wheth­
er the streets are slippery. But if I want an argument that uses 
the judgment that Fred is 80% reliable as one ingredient, then I 
will use a conditioning design that requires two further proba­
bility judgments: (1) A prior probability, say p, for the pro­
position that the streets are slippery: this will be a judgment 
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based on evidence other than Fred's announcement. (2) A condi­
tional probability, say q, that Fred's announcement will be 
accurate even though it is careless. Given these ingredients, I 
can calculate a Bayesian probability that the streets are slip-
pery given Fred's announcement and my other evidence: 
-
.Bp + .2pq 
P(slipperylannouncement} = 
.Bp + .2pq + .2(1-p)(l-q) 
( 3) 
Is the Bayesian argument (3) better than the belief-function 
argument (2)? This depends on whether I have the evidence re­
quired. If I do have evidence to support the judgments p and q-­
if, that is to say, my situation really Js quite like a situation 
where the streets and Fred are governed by known chances, then 
(3} is a good argument, clearly more convincing than (2) because 
it takes more evidence into account. But if the evidence on 
which I base p and q is of much lower quality than the evidence 
on which I base the number 80% , then (2} will be more convincing. 
The traditional debate between the frequentist and Bayesian 
views has centered on the quality of evidence for prior proba­
bilities. It is worth remarking, therefore, that we might well 
feel that q, rather than p, is the weak point in the argument 
(3). I probably will have some other evidence about whether it 
is slippery outside, but I may not have any idea about how likely 
it is that Fred's careless remarks will accidentally be true. 
A critic of the belief-function argument (2) might be­
tempted to claim that the Bayesian argument (3) shows (2) to be 
wrong even if I do lack the evidence needed to supply p and q. 
Formula (3) gives the correct probability for whether the street 
is slippery , the critic might contend, even if I cannot say what 
this probability is, and it is almost certain to differ from (2). 
This criticism is fundamentally misguided. In order to say that 
(3) gives the "correct" probability, I must be able to convin­
cingly compare my situation to the picture of chance. And my 
inability to model Fred when he is being careless is not just a 
matter of not knowing the chances--it is a matter of not being 
able to fit him into a chance picture at all. 
Example 2. Suppose I do have some other evidence about 
whether the streets are slippery: my trusty indoor-outdoor ther­
mometer says that the temperature is 31 degrees Fahrenheit, and I 
know that bec�use of the traffi7 ice could not form on the 
streets at th1s temperature. 
My thermometer could be wrong. It has been very accurate in 
the past, but such devices do not last forever. Suppose I judge 
that there is a 99% chance that the thermometer is working pro­
perly, and I also judge that Fred's behavior is independent of 
whether it is working properly or not. (For one thing, he has 
not been close enough to my desk this morning to see it.) Then I 
have determined probabilities for the four possible answers to 
the question, " Is Fred being truthful or careless, and is the 
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thermometer working properly or not?" For example, I have deter­
mined the probability .8x.99=.792 for the answer "Fred is being 
truthful, and the thermometer is working properly." All four 
possible answers, together with their probabilities, are shown in 
the first two columns of Table 1. We may call the set of these 
four answers our new frame S. 
Taking into account what Fred and the thermometer have said, 
I have the compatibility relation'between S andT given in the 
last column of the table. (Recall that T considers whether the 
streets are slippery; T={yes,no}.) The element (truthful,wor­
king) of s is ruled out by this compatibility relation (since 
Fred and the thermometer are contradicting each other, they 
cannot both be on the level); hence I c�ndition the initial 
probabilities by eliminating the probability for (truthful,wor­
king) and renormalizing the three others. The resulting poster­
ior probabilities on S are given in the third column of the 
table. 
Finally, applying (1) with these posterior probabilities on 
S, I obtain the degrees of belief 
Bel({yes})=.04 and Bel({no})=.95. ( 4 ) 
This result reflects that fact that I put much more trust in the 
thermometer than in Fred. 
The preceding calculation is an example of Dempster's rule 
of combination for belief functions. Dempster's rule combines 
two or more belief functions defined on the same frame but based 
on independent arguments or items of evidence; the result is a 
belief function based on the pooled evidence. In this case the 
belief function given by (2), which is based on Fred's testimony 
alone, is being combined with the belief function given by 
Bel({yes})=O and Bel({no})=.99, ( 5 ) 
which is based on the evidence of the thermometer alone. In 
general, as in this example, Dempster's rule corresponds to the 
formation and subsequent conditioning of a product measure in the 
background. See Shafer (1985) for a precise account of the 
independence conditions needed for Dempster's rule. 
s 
(truthful,working) 
(truthful,not) 
(careless,working) 
(careless, not) 
Probability of s 
Initial Posterior 
. 792 
. 008 
.198 
. 002 
0 
.04 
.95 
.01 
Table l. 
95 
Elements of T 
compatible with s 
yes 
no 
yes,no 
Example 3. Dempster's rule applies only when two items of 
evidence are independent, but belief functions can also be de­
rived from models for dependent evidence. 
Suppose, for example, that I do not judge Fred's testimony 
to be independent of the evidence provided by the thermometer. I 
exclude the possibility that Fred has tampered with the thermom­
eter and also the possibility that there are factors affecting 
both Fred's truthfulness and the thermometer's accuracy. But 
suppose now that Fred does have regular access to the thermom­
eter, and I think that he would likely know if it were not 
working. I know from experience that it just in situations like 
this, where something is awry, that Fred tends to let his fancy 
run free. 
\ 
In this case, I would not assign the elements of S the 
probabilities given in the second column of Table 1 .  Instead, I 
might assign the proba�ilities given in the second column of 
Table 2. These probabilities follow from my judgment that Fred 
is truthful 80% of the time and that the thermometer has a 99% 
chance of working, together with the further �udgment that Fred 
has a 90% chance of being careless if the thermometer is not 
working. 
When I apply (1) with the posterior probabilities given in 
Table 2, I obtain the degrees of belief 
Bel({yes})=.005 and BE;?l({no})= .95. 
These differ from (4 ), e_ven though the belief functions based on 
the separate items of evidence are still be given by (2) and (5). 
' 
I would like to emphasize that nothing in the philosophy of 
constructive probability or the language of belief functions 
requires us to deny the fact that Baysian arguments are often 
valuable and convincing. The examples I have just discussed were 
designed to convince the reader that belief-function arguments 
are sometimes more convincing than Bayesian arguments, not that 
this is always or even usually the case. What the language of 
belief functions does require us to reject is the philosophy 
according to which use of the Bayesian language is normative. 
s 
(truthful,working) 
(truthful,not) 
(careless,working) 
(careless,not) 
Probability of s 
Initial Posterior 
.799 
.001 
.191 
.009 
0 
.005 
.950 
.04 5 
Table 2. 
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Elements of T 
compatible with s 
yes 
no 
yes,no 
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From a technical point of view, the language of belief 
functions is a generalization of the Bayesian language. But as 
our examples illustrate� the spirit of the language of belief 
functions can be distinguished from the spirit of the Bayesian 
language by saying that a belief-function argument involves a 
probability model for the evidence bearing on a question, while a 
Bayesian argument involves a probability model for the answer to 
the question. 
Of course, the Bayesian language can also model evidence. 
As we have seen in our examples, the probability judgments made 
in a belief-function argument can usually be adapted to a Baye­
sian argument that models both the answer to the question and the 
evidence for it by assessing prior prob�bilities for the answer 
and conditional probabilities for the evidence given the answer. 
The only problem is that we may lack the evidence needed to make 
all the judgments required by this Bayesian argument convincing. 
Thus we may say that the advantage gained by the belief-function 
generalization of the Bayesian language is the ability to use 
,certain kinds of incomplete probability models. 
3. Probability Judgment in Expert Systems. 
In statistics and many other fields, it is often taken for 
granted that "subjective probability" means Bayesian probability. 
But most of the expert systems developed during the past ten 
years have not used full-fledged Bayesian designs, and the crea­
tors of these systems have shown great interest in belief func­
tions and other alternatives to Bayesian methods. Why is this? 
We can gain some insight into this question by noting that 
the idea of an expert system developed from efforts to apply 
systems of production rules to practical problems. Workers in 
artificial intelligence were attracted to production systems, or 
systems of if-then rules, because the modular character of these 
rules and the unstructured programming that they allowed seemed 
to correspond to the flexibility in acquiring and using knowledge 
that is characteristic of human intelligence. 
It is clear that a Bayesian design does not have this modu­
lar character. We are not free to add or remove probability 
judgments from a Bayesian design in the way that we are free to 
add or remove production rules from a production system. A 
Bayesian design specifies very rigidly just what probability 
judgments it requires. 
The designers of early systems such as PROSPECTOR and MYC IN 
were forced to compromise between modularity and conformity with 
the standards of Bayesian design. In the case of PROSPECTOR, the 
result was a set of quasi-Bayesian rules for combining probabili­
ties, together with some ad hoc restrictions on the modularity of 
the system. In the case of MYCIN, the result was an ad hoc set 
of rules for combining "certainty factors," rules that turned out 
to be very similar to the rules for belief functions (Gordon and 
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Shortliffe, 1984 ). 
The interest in belief functions among designers of expert 
systems can be attributed in large measure to the greater modu­
larity it permits. Dempster's rule allows us to formally add or 
remove any item of evidence in a belief-function analysis, pro­
vided only that it is independent of the other items of evidence 
being combined. 
The philosophy of constructive probability makes it clear, 
however, that this greater modularity is only a matter of degree. 
All probability judgment, whether Bayesian or belief-function, 
requires a design. In the Bayesian case we must decide what to 
condition on. In both cases we must make either make judgments 
of independence or else construct more complicated designs that 
take dependence into account. 
I believe that in the next few years both Bayesian and 
belief-function designs will find their niches in the world of 
expert systems. Bayesian designs will predominate in systems 
that are repeatedly applied under conditions so constant that 
the picture of answers determined at random with known chances 
fits. Belief-function designs will be more succe�ful in systems 
whose each use represents a relatively unusual conjunction of 
different small worlds of experience. All these systems will, 
however, fit only certain narrow kinds of problems. They will 
fall far short of the flexibility of human probability judgment. 
Human probability judgment is flexible not because it is 
modular, but because it includes the capacity to design probabil­
ity arguments as well as the .capacity to carry out sucn aes1gn�. 
The deepest and most intriguing challenge for probability in 
artificial intelligence is the development of this capacity for 
design. 
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